Operations of the 2nd Battalion, 120th Infantry
(30th Infantry Division) at Mortain, France
6 - 12 August 1944
(Northern France Campaign)

Personal Experiences of a Company Commander

Cont'd

12 August: Relief

Elements of the 35th infantry Division had been putting constant pressure on the enemy south of MORTAIN. They were aware of the battalion's situation, and had brought supplies along with their assault echelon. At approximately 1130 hours, the leading elements of the 320th Infantry made contact with G Company. Even though they had undergone heavy fighting, and had suffered severe casualties, they quickly evacuated the wounded and distributed food. The 1st Battalion, 119th Infantry, came through the town of MORTAIN, and made contact with K Company. The 2nd Battalion, 120th Infantry was completely relieved at 1300 hours, 12 August. The battalion had succeeded in fulfilling its mission, but at a bloody price. The battalion lost a total of 277 men killed, captured and missing inaction. (33)
It would be impossible to record here the acts of self sacrifice and personal bravery displayed by the men and officers of the battalion during this period. They were magnificent. Some of these men were rewarded for their actions; some were not. Due to the fast moving situation, recommendations for awards were processed unusually slow, and some of the men were awarded decorations posthumously. Some of the awards were made as late as November. Some of the recommendations for awards were lost in the scramble to get moving, and were never awarded to those men to whom they were due.
This battalion had often been referred to in official and unofficial documents as the "Lost Battalion of WWII". This is a misnomer if ever there was one - the battalion was isolated, but never "lost".

Footnotes:
(1) 1, p.126
(2) 2, Situation Map #1
(3) 4, p.274
(4) 4, p.16
(5) 2, p.14
(6) 8, p.236
(7) Personal Knowledge
(8) 5, 6 August '44
(9) 2, p.4
(10) 10, p.43
(11) Personal Knowledge
(12) A-10, p.43
(13) 10, p.46
(14) Personal Knowledge
(15) Personal Knowledge
(16) Personal Knowledge
(17) 10, p. 47
(18) Personal Knowledge
(19) Personal Knowledge
(20) 10, p.48
(21) Personal Knowledge
(22) Personal Knowledge
(23) 6, p.19
(24) Personal Knowledge
(25) 10,p264
(26) Personal Knowledge
(27) Personal Knowledge
(28) 10, p.49
(29) Personal Knowledge
(30) Personal Knowledge
(31) 6, p. 19
(32) Personal Knowledge
(33) 10, p. 264

ANALYSIS AND CRITICISM

Intelligence

In order for intelligence to be of any value, it must be disseminated in time to be used. Throughout this entire operation, the battalion's source of information was by observation. Documents of higher headquarters indicate that this attack was expected at approximately the date and place that it happened. This information was not passed down to the front line units. Had the front line units known of this impending attack, food and ammunition could have been dumped on position, adequate communications arranged, and above all, a different type of defense could have been planned. The same mission could have been accomplished at a much lighter cost in manpower and equipment.

Conduct of the Defense

This Hill was successfully defended, but at a price we could ill afford to pay. The situation dictated that this relief be made as fast as possible. Commanders concerned were allowed too little time to make the relief, and as a result, some elements of the battalion had no idea where the rest of the battalion was located. Fires between companies were not properly coordinated. In occupying the 1st Battalion, 18th Infantry positions, the 2nd Battalion, 120th Infantry, found itself with no reserve whatsoever. This proved to be a very costly mistake. There must be depth to any defensive position. Supporting fires were not properly coordinated until after the enemy had by-passed the positions.

Supporting Arms

Nothing but praise can be given to the supporting arms, mainly the artillery and the air. Had it not been for the artillery, there can be little doubt that the battalion would have been destroyed or captured. The lions share must go to the artillery for the successful defense of this Hill.. They accounted for numerous enemy vehicles and inflicted terrible losses to foot troops. The air drop was the only supply that the battalion had for its entire stay on the Hill. They also literally "played hell" with the enemy armored columns and assembly areas. They made his supply routes a dangerous road to travel.

Communications

After the enemy launched his first attack, communications were entirely by radio. Security was poor, and no doubt the enemy was well informed on the situation of the battalion. This was evident by the timely request of the enemy to surrender.

Evacuation

The presence of the dead and wounded within the position was detrimental to morale. Rapid evacuation is most important where possible. In the event that evacuation is impossible, they must be removed from sight, and their positions carefully marked and reported. In this particular action this was not done. As a consequence, several bodies have not been recovered to date.

Leadership

The leadership of the officers and NCO's of this battalion was superb. Knowing that the Battalion Commander and staff were captured, the company officers issued and carried out orders that they felt ordinarily would have been issued. The NCO's were outstanding, many of them being called upon to perform duties ordinarily expected of officers. They were very efficient and accepted their duties as a challenge. This was a situation where personal example and contact was of all importance. Some of these men displayed personal bravery that was amazing, and by their acts, they certainly inspired their men and instilled the will to win, in the heart of every man.

Awards and Decorations

The recommendations for awards to the men of this battalion were too slow. During the time from submission to final action, many of the men had been killed. The bulk of the awards were made in late November. This is entirely too long, as the award loses much of its effect when delayed for such a long time.

LESSONS

1. Detailed intelligence reports must be disseminated down to the lowest level of unit, as well as to higher units.
2. Our present principles of defense are sound and must be adhered to. Under no circumstances, should depth be omitted from a defensive plan. Supporting fire plans must be well coordinated with organic fire plans.
3. Radio security must be practiced at all times.
4. Dead and wounded must be evacuated as rapidly as possible.
5. Added responsibilities should be given to NCO's, especially in training.
6. Awards and decorations must be processed as rapidly as possible, and appropriate presentation ceremonies held.
7. A determined isolated unit, supplied by air, can defend a position indefinitely.

PERTINENT OFFICERS OF THE 120TH REGIMENT

The Following is a Listing of most of the officers of the 120th Regimental Hq., and the 2nd Battalion of the 120th Infantry, most all of whom are referred to in the forgoing article.

Col. Hammond D. Birks, Regimental Commander, 120th Infantry

Lt. Col. Eads G. Hardaway, 2nd Battalion Commander
Maj. Gardner M. Simes, Bn. Executive Officer
Capt. Willie B. Irby, S-1
Capt. Anthony, S-2
Lt. Pike, S-3
Lt. Guy B. Hagen, Communications Officer
Lt. Ralph A. Kerley, Co. "E" Commander
Capt. Reynold C. Erichson, Co. "F" Commander
Lt. Tom E. H. Andrew, Co. "F" Plat. Ldr.
Lt. Ronal E. Woody, Co. "G" Commander
Capt. Delmont K. Byrn, Co. "H" Commander
Lt. Joseph C. Reaser, Co. "K" Commander
Lt. Thomas Springfield, Co "A", 1st Plat. Ldr., 823rd T.D. Bn.
Lt. Sidney Eichen, A.T. Co., 1st Plat. Ldr., 120th Infantry
Col. Smith, Regimental Commander, 18th Infantry, 1st Division

STATISTICS OF UNWOUNDED SURVIVORS

Following the relief on Hill #314, the remaining Unwounded were:
Co. "C" 24
Co. "E" 100
Co. "F" 8
Co. "G" 103
Co. "H" 18
Co. "K" 100
A.T. Plat. 4
Can. Co. 5 (Observers)
823rd 1st Plat. 8
230th F.A. Bn. 6 (F.O's)

A total of 376 were able to walk off the HILL #314 upon relief on 12 August 1944.

A normal Company strength is approximately 200 men.
Recopied & Formatted 4/01/03 with Added Statistics & Data By: Frank W. Towers.

-end-