Operations of the 2nd Battalion, 120th Infantry
(30th Infantry Division) at Mortain, France
6 - 12 August 1944
(Northern France Campaign)

Personal Experiences of a Company Commander

Cont'd

NARRATION

6 August: The First Day and Night at Mortain

The 2nd Battalion, 120th Infantry, with K Company attached, and two platoons of Tank Destroyers and one platoon from the A.T. Company in support, were to relieve the 1st Battalion, 18th Infantry and attachments on the high ground east of MORTAIN.
The 2nd Battalion Commander and staff proceeded to the 1st Battalion, 18th Infantry C.P. Guides were furnished from each company, and the Company Commanders went on a reconnaissance of their respective areas. In the meantime, the battalion was being moved forward on foot by the Battalion Executive Officer.
The order to move had been executed so rapidly, it had been impossible for regiment to secure maps of this area. However, the 2nd Battalion S-2 secured a few large scale maps from the 1st Battalion, 18th Infantry, scarcely enough for a company. In addition, the Company Commanders of the 1st Battalion, 18th Infantry, turned their maps over to the relieving companies. These had been in use for several days and were crumpled and badly marked.
To effect the fastest relief possible, the exact positions of the 1st Battalion, 18th Infantry, were taken over by the 2nd Battalion, 120th Infantry, with the exception of the tanks of the 1st Battalion, 18th Infantry. The 2nd Battalion of the 120th infantry had no tanks, either attached or in support at this time. As a consequence, the 2nd Battalion had no reserve. Wire nets were left in place, and the fire plan of the 1st Battalion, 18th Infantry, were accepted by the 2nd Battalion Commander, until such time as he could formulate his own. The 2nd Battalion, 120th Infantry, completed the relief and accepted responsibility for the area at approximately 061350 August. (13) (14) (See Map C)
It must be pointed out at this time, that the positions prepared by the 1st Battalion, 18th Infantry, were for a hasty defense only and were never intended to contain a strong counter-attack. Although they were sufficient for a hasty defense, they were far from satisfactory for a sustained defense. The line was of necessity extended and thinly held. The Battalion Command and Company Commanders were fully aware of this, and planned to improve the position with fortifications, mines etc., as soon as they became available. Unfortunately, these intended improvements never came to pass.
The 1st Battalion, 18th Infantry, had scarcely cleared the area when the first signs of enemy activity appeared. At approximately 1430 hours, a lone enemy plane was sighted overhead. Shortly thereafter, a group of five enemy planes were sighted and bombing could be heard well to the rear. All of the commanders were very much concerned over this, since this was the first daylight air offensive the battalion had ever encountered. The battalion was alerted and continued to improve individual positions as much as possible. Digging was difficult, as the ground was hard and rocky, and in some places, solid rock was encountered eight inches below the surface. The artillery and cannon observers arrived and registered their protective fires. With the exception of the air activity, all had been quiet.
The kitchens had accompanied the battalion on the move south, and at dusk, a hot meal was served and two K ration units issued to each man for breakfast and dinner the following day. The area was extremely quiet and seemed much like the rest area of the day before.
Perhaps the battalion was suffering a false sense of security. If so, possibly the following factors contributed to it: a. There was no concrete information regarding the enemy; b. The move to MORTAIN had been made with no enemy contact; c. The French civilians had lined the roads, cheering, throwing bouquets and offering drinks at every halt. One could easily feel that the Germans would not stop short of the RHINE RIVER. If such a feeling existed, it was quickly squelched. (15)
At approximately 070100 August, the enemy launched his attack in force. Striking from the east and southeast, he quickly overran the roadblock south of MORTAIN, and in a matter of minutes, he was in the outskirts of MORTAIN itself. Small groups succeeded in infiltrating into G Company's sector, screaming at the top of their voices, "Heil Hitler"! The group's attack was vicious and made enough noise that one could easily believe an entire battalion was attacking. Their success was short lived, however. At the first crack of dawn, G Company annihilated them. (16)
At approximately 070200 August, the enemy's attack hit the left flank of the battalion in the vicinity of ABBAYE BLANCHE. The roadblock held its position and inflicted severe casualties on the enemy. A number of the enemy bypassed the roadblock, however, and entered MORTAIN from the north.
Since the battalion had no reserve, regiment committed its reserve, Company C, with the mission of driving the enemy out of MORTAIN and reestablishing the southern roadblock. Company C was unable to accomplish this mission, and by dawn, the enemy occupied MORTAIN with infantry and armor. Elements of the 2nd Battalion on HILL #314, were now completely surrounded. (17)

7 August: The Second Day and Night

The dawn was accompanied by a dense fog. So dense in fact, that some of the units on the HILL #314, thought that the enemy was smoking the position. By 0800 hours, the sun had burned through the mist and revealed columns of enemy armor and foot troops streaming from the east and southeast.
Whether the enemy was ignorant of the fact that the HILL #314 was occupied, or had simply chosen to ignore it, is not known and really doesn't matter. His closed formations made a definite target for our artillery. Corps artillery was called in and the casualties and damage to their vehicles was incredible. The undamaged vehicles quickly dispersed and withdrew. The artillery and cannon observers registered additional concentrations, and now a solid ring of artillery fire could be fired on call. (18)
If the enemy had not known before, that the HILL #314 was occupied, he certainly knew it now. Apparently they realized the importance of controlling the hill. If they gained the HILL #314, not only would they eliminate our artillery fire, but would have excellent observation for miles on our positions.
At approximately 1000 hours, the enemy dumped everything in the book in the line of artillery and mortar fire on our positions, and K and E Companies received a bombing and a strafing attack. The enemy infantry, with some armor, followed the artillery preparation closely. Our own artillery was called on and was very effective in breaking up the attack. The main attack had been broken, but not before the enemy had made a penetration into E Company's area. A severe fire fight resulted, and finally the enemy was driven out and the lines reestablished. E Company paid a price for this small victory; casualties were high. (19)
Units on the HILL #314 had been out of contact with the Battalion Commander and the C.P. since the first attack started. The Battalion C.P. was located in the town of MORTAIN, in the Hotel de la Poste. By this time there were more enemy troops in the town, than there were of our own troops, and the Battalion Commander decided to join his units up on the HILL #314. He and his staff were forced into hiding and were captured the following day. The group included the Battalion Commander, Executive officer, S-2 and S-3 and approximately 15 men from Battalion Headquarters Company. (20)
Since there was no communication with Battalion, the senior officer, the F Company Commander, assumed command temporarily. The bulk of F Company was in the town however, and isolated from the rest of the battalion. The defense of the Hill was left to the initiative of the Rifle Company Commanders on the HILL #314. Each Company Commander picked the strongest point in his area and set up individual perimeter defenses. (21)
At approximately 1400 hours, the enemy attempted to take the HILL from the west, that is, from the town of MORTAIN itself. G Company repulsed this attack in short order, but again the enemy succeeded in inflicting severe casualties. During the night the enemy sent patrols into the area. Although they were allowed to come up onto the HILL, they never got off. Each company formed patrols and ferreted them out.
The last of the K rations were consumed at noon, ammunition was dangerously low and the evacuation of dead and wounded was impossible. This was one of the most serious problems confronting the company commanders. Communication with regiment was entirely by radio, and this contact was sporadic. Regiment was requested to supply by air some food, ammunition and medical supplies.
Although the enemy harassed the position all night with patrols, artillery and mortar fire, morale was fair at the end of this period. (22)

8 August: The Third Day and Night

The 8th of August was fairly quiet. The enemy made no serious attempt to take the position. He continued his attack, by-passing the HILL #314. The observers on the HILL #314 had all round observation and made the most of it. The enemy supply lines and rear areas were constantly harassed by our artillery.
The serious problem of food, ammunition and medical supplies still confronted the battalion. Radio batteries were rapidly weakening. In an effort to conserve the batteries, only one company turned on its radio at a time, with the exception of calling fire missions. Orders and information received from regiment was disseminated to the companies by patrol.
The wounded were collected in each company and placed in slit trenches. They were made as comfortable as possible; however there was no medical aid available. Presence of dead did not serve to raise morale. Since most of the dead were in exposed positions, it was necessary to wait until dark to collect them. They too were placed in a central location in each company area, out of sight. Although the men knew the bodies had not been evacuated from the Hill, they couldn't see them and the same purpose was served as if they had been evacuated.
Enemy combat patrols harassed the position all night and the battalion got little or no sleep. In spite of the adverse conditions, morale remained fair. (23)

9 August: Surrender Ultimatum

Attempts by the regiment and the remainder of the division to relieve the battalion had failed. The first gnawing pains of hunger and thirst were appearing. The ammunition supply had dwindled to practically nothing. Several of the severely wounded died during the night.. The bodies of the dead, both our own and the enemy, were deteriorating fast in the warm August sun, and the stench on the Hill was nauseating. The future looked anything but bright, and morale was on the rapid decline. (24)
In an effort to relieve the situation, supplies were loaded into two of the division artillery liaison planes, with the mission of supplying the battalion. Both of these planes were hit by enemy anti-aircraft fire as soon as they approached the enemy lines. It was apparent that if the battalion was to be supplied by air, it would have to be done by faster aircraft.
Division tried next to schedule a flight of C-47's for the supply mission. Finally, after four requests were made through slow moving channels, a flight was scheduled for 10 August. This information was relayed to the besieged men, but due to past unpleasant experiences with close supporting air, there was some doubt of success in the minds of the men. (25)
The enemy had no doubt been monitoring our radio and knew the existing situation. At approximately 1800 hours, a German officer approached Company E position under a white flag. He was met by a platoon leader from Company E. The German officer stated that he was an officer of the S.S., and was in a position to offer honorable surrender to the Americans. He further stated that he had admired the stand made by the battalion. He was very careful to point out, however, that the situation was hopeless. He named several of the officers in the Battalion Command group who were captured. He further pointed out that certainly it would be no disgrace to surrender under the circumstances, and promised that the men would be well cared for and the wounded given every possible aid. His last promise was that if his offer was not accepted by 2000 hours, the battalion would be blown to bits. The platoon leader relayed the message to the E Company Commander. Some sources quote E Company Commander as saying that he would not surrender until the last round of ammunition had been fired and the last bayonet broken off in a German belly. Actually the reply wasn't quite so dramatic. It was short, to the point, and very unprintable! (26) (27)
True to their promise, the enemy launched a strong attack at approximately 2015 hours. The battalion ammunition supply was so low, the enemy encountered little resistance other than our artillery. After the enemy had penetrated the position, the E Company Commander called artillery on his own position. This broke up the attack and the enemy took a severe beating. This success served as a 'shot in the arm" to the sagging morale of the men on the Hill.

10 August: The Air Drop

Although the air drop had been scheduled for 10 August, the men on the Hill had little hope for success. The morning had been spent in comparative quiet. At approximately 1530 hours, a group of our fighter planes appeared and they dive bombed and strafed several enemy areas, starting fires and explosions. After they had accomplished their mission, they circled and came in low over the battalion positions. The men on the Hill jumped for their fox holes, fearing that the fighters had mistaken our positions for that of the enemy. Their fears were false however. At 1600 hours, the fighters returned, escorting a flight of C-47's. Possibly the most beautiful sight the men had ever seen, was the multicolored parachutes lazily floating down. Approximately one half of the drop landed far into the enemy lines, but at least, the battalion had some food, ammunition and a limited amount of medical supplies. One of the most important items contained in the drop was radio batteries. A report was made to regiment of the drop and an attempt to schedule another drop was made, especially for medical supplies. (28)
In the meantime, the S-3 of the 230th Field Artillery Battalion had an idea to relieve the situation. Ten rounds of M-84 (base ejection HC smoke)) ammunition were opened, and the smoke canisters and base ejection charge removed. The rounds were then filled with medical supplies, bandages, dressings, sulfanilamide and morphine syrettes. The steel disc in the nose was replaced to prevent the fuze, when detonated, from ruining the contents. Four other shells were treated likewise, and were filled with sand to approximately the same weight. These rounds were to be used for adjustment.
The S-3 them made his intentions known to the men on the Hill and gave instructions for opening the projectiles. The adjustment was completed at approximately 2130 hours, and the medical rounds were then fired. None of these rounds were recovered due to ricochets and darkness.
Even though the medical supplies were badly needed, the presence of food and ammunition served to raise morale to a new high.

11 August: Enemy Withdrawal

As soon as the mist lifted on 11 August, the artillery again attempted to fire in medical supplies. Six rounds were fired and all were recovered. This operation was only partially successful, however, the concussion being too great for the containers of the morphine and plasma. (31)
Enemy traffic towards the east was increasing, with very little traffic towards our lines. Evidently the enemy was starting a withdrawal. With communications reestablished with regiment and the artillery, the battalion was able to inflict untold damage on the withdrawing columns. Several air strikes were requested, and were carried out at what seemed to be all at the same time. The Air Corps pounded the enemy columns unmercifully, and the burning enemy columns could be seen for miles in all directions. This slaughter continued all day.
During the night, the major enemy foot elements started their withdrawal. Our artillery plastered every available route of withdrawal and was very effective, as was evidenced by the screams and hysterical cries of the enemy. There was no doubt now that relief was certain, and the battalion rested and listened to the constant singing of the outgoing artillery. (32)

 

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