Operations of the
2nd Battalion, 120th Infantry
(30th Infantry Division) at Mortain, France
6 - 12 August 1944
(Northern France Campaign)
Personal Experiences of a Company Commander
An Isolated Infantry Battalion
Defending a Key Terrain Feature
Major Ralph A. Kerley
Monograph Written for the
Advanced Infantry Officer's Class #1
1949 - 1950
ORIENTATION
Introduction
This monograph covers the operations of the 2nd Battalion, 120th
Infantry Regiment, 30th Infantry Division, in the defense of MORTAIN,
FRANCE, 6 - 12 August 1944, during the "Breakout".
To enable the reader to fully understand and appreciate this action,
it will be necessary to review the major plans and preceding operations
of higher headquarters.
In June 1944, the First U. S. Army and the British Second Army
successfully invaded the NORMANDY coast of FRANCE. The mission
was "to secure a lodgment area on the continent from which
further offensive operations could be developed". (1) The
initial mission was accomplished and the Allies proceeded to expand
their beachhead. The slow, costly, bitter battles of the hedgerows
ensued. Finally, on 25 July 1944, the Allies held an east-west
line from CAEN through CAUMONT and ST. LO to the west coast. (See
Map A)
From this line, "Operation COBRA" was launched and a
penetration was effected in the ST. LO area. First Army then raced
south. On 6 August 1944, First Army had advanced as far south
as MAYENNE and held the line shown on Map A. (2)
On 1 August 1944, General Patton, with his Third Army, received
responsibility for the area on First Army's right. At this time,
the British secured the high ground between the VIRE and the ORNE
RIVERS, and continued to keep pressure on the Enemy's right flank.
Resistance on the enemy left flank crumbled, and the long awaited
"Breakout" was achieved. (3)
The U.S. 30th Infantry Division landed in FRANCE during the period
13-14 June 1944 and launched its first attack on 15 June 1944.
The division participated in the hedgerow battles and was one
of the spearhead divisions in the ST. LO breakthrough, and was
now a part of XIX Corps of the First Army. (4)
General Situation and Plans
First Army planned to take advantage of this situation and inflict
the greatest possible damage to the enemy. This was to be done
by retaining power in the center of the sector and striking a
cross-blow at the enemy's crumbing left flank. In order to carry
out this plan, there were some shifts of Corps boundaries, and
consequently a shifting of divisions between Corps was necessary.
On 5 August 1944, the U.S. 30th Infantry Division was shifted
from XIX Corps to VII Corps. VII Corps now was composed of the
1st, 4th, 9th and 30th Infantry Divisions and the 3rd Armored
Division, and was deployed on the right flank of First Army. The
advance of the entire First Army had slowed down appreciably,
and enemy resistance was stiffening. Apparently the enemy had
bolstered his left flank and was concentrating power in the vicinity
of MORTAIN. (5)
Elements of the 1st Division had reached MORTAIN, consolidated
positions, and were aggressively patrolling to the front. These
patrols met increasingly strong resistance and on several occasions
encountered armor. This proved later to be a part of the armor
Field Marshall von Kluge had massed for his ill fated drive to
AVRANCHES and the sea. (6)
The most critical terrain in the area lay in the vicinity of MORTAIN
and extended west to the sea. The town of MORTAIN formed a road
junction of north- south and east-west roads leading west to AVRANCHES.
There were two main roads leading from MORTAIN to AVRANCHES. Between
these two main roads lay commanding ground, the highest point
being HILL #314, and control of this ground meant control of the
roads. There were numerous secondary roads in the area, all of
which would support heavy traffic. (7) (See Map B)
On 5 August 1944, the 30th Division passed to the control of VII
Corps and was ordered to progressively relieve the 1st U.S. Division
as soon as possible. Relief of the 1st Division would allow VII
Corps to extend its lines and to continue knifing into the enemy's
flank and rear. (8)
Enemy Dispositions - 4 August 1944
On 4 August 1944, the bulk of the German 7th Army, minus XXV
Corps, faced the U.S. First Army with II Parachute Corps on the
northern flank. Extending south was LXXIV Corps and XLVII Panzer
Corps, with LXXXI Corps protecting the southern flank. The XLVII
Panzer Corps was comprised of the 116th Panzer Division, 275th
Infantry Division, and 1st, 2nd and 10th SS Panzer Divisions.
These units were located to the east and southeast of MORTAIN.
(9) Approximate locations shown on Map A)
Disposition of the 120th Infantry
On 2 August 1944, the 30th Division as a whole, passed into
XIX Corps reserve. the 120th Infantry was given a well earned
rest in the vicinity of TESSY-SUR-VIRE during the period 3-4 August
1944. Reorganize and rest was the order of the day until 5 August
1944, when the regiment was alerted for movement. (10)
The Battalion Situation
On 2 August, the 2nd Battalion was ordered into a rest area in
the vicinity of TESSY-SUR-VIRE. The battalion welcomed this opportunity
to rest and especially to reorganize. The fighting around TESSY
had been fierce, and casualties were heavy.
During this period replacements were received, the men were paid,
given showers and clean clothes. The battalion was completely
re-equipped. U.S.O shows and Red Cross wagons were nearby. Replacements
had the opportunity to acquaint themselves with the men, non-commissioned
officers and platoon leaders of their respective platoons. This
situation was rare indeed.
All was not play however. On company level, previous combat lessons
were taught to the replacements and, much to the disgust of all
concerned, small unit tactical maneuvers were practiced and studied.
Morale was extremely high. (11)
Movement To Mortain
At 052024 August, the 120th RCT received the order to move by
motor from the vicinity of TESSY-SUR-VIRE to the town of PERCY,
where the convoy would be met by guides, and conducted to MORTAIN.
The mission was to relieve the 18th Infantry, 1st Infantry Division.
Leading elements of the RCT crossed the I.P. at 060130 August.
The move south to MORTAIN, a distance of approximately 45 miles,
was uneventful, and the regiment closed into its assembly area
at about 061000 August.
The Regimental Commander, having received no information other
than a movement order and his mission, preceded the regiment to
MORTAIN. The information received from the 18th Infantry Commander
regarding the enemy was favorable though sketchy. The area had
been comparatively quiet and apparently there was no immediate
threat. As a result, the front line battalions went into the line
with only information gained from Battalion and Company Commanders
if the 18th Infantry. A physical daylight relief was decided upon
by the two Regimental Commanders. (12)
Cont'd
Second
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